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Abstract
How important are ﬁrm entry and exit in shaping aggregate dynamics? We ad-
dress this question by characterizing the equilibrium allocation in Hopenhayn (1992)’s
model of equilibrium industry dynamics, amended to allow for investment in physical
capital and aggregate ﬂuctuations. We ﬁnd that entry and exit propagate the eﬀects
of aggregate shocks. In turn, this results in greater persistence and unconditional
variation of aggregate time–series. In the aftermath of a positive productivity shock,
the number of entrants increases. The new ﬁrms are smaller and less productive than
the incumbents, as in the data. As the common productivity component reverts to its
unconditional mean, the new entrants that survive become progressively more produc-
tive, keeping aggregate eﬃciency higher than in a scenario without entry or exit. We
also ﬁnd that both the mean and variance of the cross–sectional distribution of ﬁrm–
level productivity are counter–cyclical, in spite of the assumption that innovations to
ﬁrm–level productivity are i.i.d. and orthogonal to aggregate shocks. This happens
because of selection: the idiosyncratic productivity of the marginal entrant is lower in
expansion than during recessions. Since idiosyncratic productivity is mean–reverting,
mean and variance of the distribution of productivity growth are pro–cyclical.
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During the last 25 years or so, the empirical research in industrial organization has pointed
out a tremendous amount of between–ﬁrms and between–plants heterogeneity, even within
narrowly deﬁned sectors. Yet, for most of its young life the modern theory of business
cycles has completely disregarded such variation. What is the loss of generality implied
by this methodological choice?
There are many reasons why heterogeneity may matter for aggregate ﬂuctuations,
some of which have received a substantial attention in the literature.1 Our goal is to
contribute to the understanding of the role played by entry and exit. What are, if any,
the costs of abstracting from ﬁrm entry and exit when modeling aggregate ﬂuctuations?
We address this question by characterizing the equilibrium allocation in Hopenhayn
(1992)’s model of industry dynamics, amended to allow for investment in physical cap-
ital and for aggregate ﬂuctuations. We assume that ﬁrms’ productivity is the product
of a common and an idiosyncratic component, which are driven by persistent stochastic
processes and orthogonal to each other. Diﬀerently from Hopenhayn (1992), potential
entrants are in ﬁnite mass and face diﬀerent probability distributions over the ﬁrst real-
ization of the idiosyncratic shock.
When parameterized to match a set of empirical regularities on investment, entry,
and exit, our framework replicates well–documented stylized facts about ﬁrm dynamics.
To start with, the exit hazard rate declines with age. The growth rate of employment is
decreasing with size and age, both unconditionally and conditionally. The size distribution
of ﬁrms is skewed to the right. When tracking the size distribution over the life a cohort,
the skewness declines with age. Furthermore, the entry rate is pro–cyclical, while the exit
rate is counter–cyclical.
The mechanics of entry is straightforward. A positive shock to the common produc-
tivity component makes entry more appealing. Entrants are more plentiful, but of lower
average idiosyncratic eﬃciency. This is the case because ﬁrms with lower prospects about
their productivity ﬁnd it worth to enter. Aggregate output and TFP are lower than they
would be in the absence of this selection eﬀect. However, given the small output share of
entering ﬁrms, the contemporaneous response of output is not very diﬀerent from the one
that obtains in a model that abstracts from entry and exit.
It is the evolution of the new entrants that causes a sizeable impact on aggregate
1This is the case for the possibility that the occasional synchronization in the timing of establishments’
investment may inﬂuence aggregate dynamics when nonconvex capital adjustment costs lead establish-
ments to adjust capital in a lumpy fashion. See Veracierto (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008).
1dynamics. As the common productivity component declines towards its unconditional
mean, there is a larger–than–average pool of young ﬁrms that increase in eﬃciency and
size. While the exogenous component of TFP falls, the distribution of ﬁrms over idiosyn-
cratic productivity improves. It follows that entry propagates the eﬀects of aggregate
productivity shocks on output and increases its unconditional variance.
For a version of our model without entry or exit to generate a data–conforming persis-
tence of output, the ﬁrst–order autocorrelation of aggregate productivity shocks must be
0.775. In the benchmark scenario with entry and exit, it needs only be 0.65. As pointed
out by Cogley and Nason (1995), many Real–Business–Cycle models have weak internal
propagation mechanisms. In order to generate the persistence in aggregate time–series
that we recover in the data, they must rely heavily on external sources of dynamics. Our
work shows that allowing for ﬁrm heterogeneity and for entry and exit can sensibly reduce
such reliance.
The propagation result clearly depends on the pro–cyclicality of the entry rate, for
which evidence abounds,2 and on the dynamics of young ﬁrms. According to our theory,
the relative importance of a cohort is minimal at birth and increases over time. Is there
evidence in support of this prediction?
The dynamics of young ﬁrms is reﬂected in the contribution of net entry to aggregate
productivity growth. A productivity decomposition exercise along the lines of Haltiwanger
(1997) reveals that on average the contribution of net entry to productivity growth is
positive, as entering ﬁrms tend to be more productive than the exiters they replace. Its
magnitude is small when the the interval between observations is one period (equivalent
to one year). However, it increases with the time between observations. In part, this is
due to the mere fact that the output share accounted for by entrants is larger, the longer
the horizon over which changes are measured. However, it is also due to the fact that
entrants grow in size and productivity at a faster pace than incumbents. Not surprisingly,
the contribution of net entry is pro–cyclical, mostly as a result of the cyclical behavior of
entry and exit rate.
The results of our decomposition are consistent with the evidence illustrated by Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001). Their own ﬁndings, as well as those of several other
scholars, lead them to conclude that “studies that focus on high–frequency variation tend
to ﬁnd a small contribution of net entry to aggregate productivity growth while studies over
a longer horizon ﬁnd a large role for net entry.” They go on to add that “Part of this
is virtually by construction... Nevertheless, ... The gap between productivity of entering
2See Campbell (1998) and Lee and Mukoyama (2009).
2and exiting plants also increases in the horizon over which the changes are measured
since a longer horizon yields greater diﬀerential from selection and learning eﬀects.” The
contribution of the selection eﬀect to the evolution of aggregate eﬃciency and output
emerges with full clarity from the analysis of our model.
Recently, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) and Bachman and Bayer (2009b) have docu-
mented a negative correlation between the cross–sectional standard deviation of ﬁrm–level
TFP growth and detrended output. Because of the systematic variation in entry and exit
selection highlighted by our theory, inferring properties of ﬁrm–level uncertainty from
such result is not immediate. In principle, their result could simply reﬂect a selection
bias.
Our simulations show that the selection bias exists, but reinforces their results. With
an homoscedastic process for idiosyncratic productivity, the cross–sectional standard de-
viation of ﬁrm–level TFP growth is greater during expansions than during recessions.
This is not a theory of the ﬁrm. That is, we do not provide an explanation for why
single–plant and multi–plant business entities coexist. In our setup, ﬁrms (or plants) are
decreasing–returns–to–scale technologies that produce an homogeneous good by means of
capital and labor.
Our analysis is in partial equilibrium. We assume that the demand for ﬁrms’ output
and the supply of physical capital are inﬁnitely elastic at the unit price, while the supply
of labor services has ﬁnite elasticity. The wage rate ﬂuctuates to ensure that the labor
market clears. This is crucial, as it is often the case in economics that eﬀects of shocks
on endogenous variables are muted or reversed by the ensuing adjustment in prices.
For given wage, our theory predicts that a positive innovation in the common compo-
nent of productivity raises the value of entering. It follows that the entry rate increases,
while entrants’ average idiosyncratic productivity declines. Whether this is a feature of
the equilibrium allocation depends on the adjustment of the wage rate.
A hike in productivity increases the marginal product of labor for all incumbents. The
labor demand schedule shifts, leading to an increase in the wage rate and to a correspond-
ing decline in the value of entering the industry. With a labor supply elasticity calibrated
to match the standard deviation of employment relative to output, the equilibrium re-
sponse of the wage rate is not large enough to undo the impact of the positive shock to
aggregate productivity.
Given the complexity of the model, most of our analysis is numerical. Our methodol-
ogy, common to many macroeconomic studies, calls for choosing some parameters based
on direct evidence. The others are selected in such a way that a set of moments computed
3on simulated data are close to their empirical counterparts. The algorithm used for the
approximation of the equilibrium allocation is described in Appendix A.
It will be shown that the vector of state variables in the ﬁrm optimization problem
consists of the distribution of ﬁrms over the two dimensions of heterogeneity, along with
the realization of the aggregate shock. Knowledge of the distribution is necessary in order
to form expectations about the evolution of the wage rate. Faced with the daunting task
of working with an inﬁnite–dimensional state space, we follow the lead of Krusell and
Smith (1998) and assume that ﬁrms form expectations by means of a simple forecasting
rule. We posit that the wage is an aﬃne function of the wage in the previous period
and the aggregate productivity shock in the current and previous period. An exhaustive
battery of tests shows that the forecasting rule is very accurate.
We have already pointed out that our framework builds on the seminal work of Hopen-
hayn (1992). This is the case for most competitive equilibrium models with aggregate
ﬂuctuations and ﬁrm heterogeneity.3 Some of these contributions abstract from entry and
exit. See for example the business cycle theories of Veracierto (2002), Khan and Thomas
(2003, 2008) and Bachman and Bayer (2009a,b), as well as the asset pricing model by
Zhang (2005). Others do not.
The predictions for the dynamics of entry and exit rates that obtain in Campbell
(1998) are very close to ours. However, Campbell (1998) focuses on investment–speciﬁc
technology shocks and makes a list of assumptions with the purpose of ensuring aggrega-
tion. In turn, this leads to an environment that has no implications for most features of
ﬁrm dynamics. Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004) and Samaniego (2008) character-
ize the equilibria of stationary economies with entry and exit and study their responses
to zero–measure aggregate productivity shocks.
Lee and Mukoyama (2009)’s framework, in which selection also leads to counter–
cyclical variation in the idiosyncratic productivity of entering ﬁrms, is perhaps the closest
to ours. Their study, however, diﬀers in key modeling assumptions. In particular, Lee and
Mukoyama (2009) do not model capital accumulation and let the free–entry condition pin
down the wage rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section
2. In Section 3 we characterize ﬁrm dynamics in the stationary economy. The analysis of
the scenario with aggregate ﬂuctuations begins in Section 4, where we describe the impact
of aggregate shocks on the entry and exit margins. In Section 5 we characterize the cyclical
3A somewhat diﬀerent strand of papers, among which Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996), Chatterjee
and Cooper (1993), and Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007), model entry in general equilibrium models
with monopolistic competition, but abstract completely from ﬁrm dynamics.
4properties of entry and exit rates, as well as the relative size of entrants and exiters. We
also gain insights into the mechanics of the model by describing the impulse responses to
an aggregate productivity shock. In Section 6 we illustrate how allowing for entry and
exit strengthen the model’s internal propagation mechanism and generates a pro–cyclical
cross–sectional standard deviation of productivity growth. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1,2,.... The horizon is inﬁnite. At time t, a positive
mass of price–taking ﬁrms produce an homogenous good by means of the production
function yt = ztst(kα
t l1−α
t )θ, with α,θ ∈ (0,1). With kt we denote physical capital, lt is
labor, and zt and st are aggregate and idiosyncratic random disturbances, respectively.
The common component of productivity zt is driven by the stochastic process
logzt+1 = ρz logzt + σzεz,t+1,
where εz,t ∼ N(0,1) for all t ≥ 0. The dynamics of the idiosyncratic component st is
described by
logst+1 = ρs logst + σsεs,t+1,
with εs,t ∼ N(0,1) for all t ≥ 0. The conditional distribution will be denoted as H(st+1|st).
Firms hire labor services on the spot market at the wage rate wt ≥ 0 and discount
future proﬁts by means of the time–invariant factor 1
R. Adjusting the capital stock by x
requires ﬁrms to incur a cost g(x,k). Capital depreciates at the rate δ ∈ (0,1).
We assume that the demand for the ﬁrm’s output and the supply of capital are in-
ﬁnitely elastic and normalize their prices at 1. The supply of labor is given by the function
Ls(w) = wγ, with γ > 0.
All operating ﬁrms must pay a ﬁxed cost cf > 0 per period. Those that quit producing
cannot re–enter the market at a later stage and obtain a value 0. The timing is summarized
in Figure 1.
Every period there is a constant mass M > 0 of prospective entrants, each of which
receives a signal q about their productivity, with q ∼ Q(q). Conditional on entry, the
distribution of the idiosyncratic shock in the ﬁrst period of existence is H(s′|q), decreasing
in q.4 Entrepreneurs that decide to enter the industry pay an entry cost ce ≥ 0.
At all t ≥ 0, the distribution of operating ﬁrms over the two dimensions of heterogene-
ity is denoted by Γt(k,s). Finally, let λt ∈ Λ denote the vector of aggregate state variables
and J(λt+1|λt) its transition operator. In Section 4, we will show that λt = {Γt,zt}.











































Figure 1: Timing in period t.
2.1 The incumbent’s optimization program
Given the aggregate state λ, capital in place k, and idiosyncratic shock s, the employment



















s.t. k′ = k(1 − δ) + x
2.2 Entry








She will invest and start operating if and only if Ve(λ,q) ≥ ce.
2.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
For given Γ0, a recursive competitive equilibrium consists of (i) value functions V (λ,k,s)
and Ve(λ,q), (ii) policy functions x(λ,k,s), l(λ,k,s), k′(λ,q), and (iii) bounded sequences
6of wages {wt}
∞
t=0, incumbents’ measures {Γt}
∞
t=1, and entrants’measures {Et}
∞
t=0 such that,
for all t ≥ 0,
1. V (λ,k,s), x(λ,k,s), and l(λ,k,s) solve the incumbent’s problem;
2. Ve(λ,q) and k′(λ,q) solve the entrant’s problem;
3. The labor market clears:
 
l(λt,k,s)dΓt(k,s) = Ls(wt) ∀ t ≥ 0,
4. For all Borel sets S × K ∈ ℜ × ℜ+ and ∀ t ≥ 0,






where Be(K,λt) = {q s.t. k′(λt,q) ∈ K and Ve(λt,q) ≥ ce};
5. For all Borel sets S × K ∈ ℜ × ℜ+ and ∀ t ≥ 0,





dΓt(k,s)dH(s′|s) + Et+1(S × K),
where B(K,λt) = {(k,s) s.t. V (λt,k,s) > 0 and k(1 − δ) + x(λt,k,s) ∈ K}.
3 The Stationary Case
We begin by analyzing the case in which there are no aggregate shocks, i.e. σz = 0. In
this scenario, our economy converges to one in which all aggregate variables are constant.
Investment adjustment costs are the sum of a ﬁxed portion and of a convex portion:




k, c0,c1 ≥ 0,
where χ(x) = 0 for x = 0 and χ(x) = 1 otherwise. Notice that the ﬁxed portion is scaled
by the level of capital in place and is paid if and only if gross investment is diﬀerent from
zero.
The distribution of signals for the entrants is Pareto. We posit that q ≥ q ≥ 0 and
that Q(q) = (q/q)ξ, ξ ∈ N, ξ > 1. The realization of the idiosyncratic shock in the ﬁrst
period of operation follows the process log(s) = ρs log(q) + σsη, where η ∼ N(0,1).
3.1 Entry and Exit
In Hopenhayn (1992), the solution to the optimal exit problem can be described by a
threshold on the productivity dimension. Firms exit if and only if their productivity draw
is lower than the threshold. The reason, very simply, is that value of continuing operations
7is strictly increasing in the idiosyncratic productivity shock, while the value of exiting is
constant. In our scenario, the continuation value is strictly increasing in both the shock
and the capital stock. It follows that there exists a decreasing schedule, call it s(k), such
that a ﬁrm equipped with capital k will exit if and only if its productivity is lower than
s(k).
Since an incumbent’s value is weakly increasing in the idiosyncratic productivity shock
and the conditional distribution H(s′|q) is decreasing in q, the value of entering is a strictly
increasing function of the signal. In turn, this means that there will be a threshold for q,
call it q∗, such that prospective entrants will enter if and only if they received a better
draw.
Let k∗(q) denote the optimal entrants’ capital choice conditional on having received
a signal q. At age 1, every cohort will consist of the prospective entrants that received a
signal q such that q ≥ q∗, followed by a ﬁrst–period shock s such that s ≥ s(k∗(q)).
Our treatment of the entry problem is diﬀerent from that in Hopenhayn (1992). There,
prospective entrants are identical. The selection in entry is due to the fact that ﬁrms that
paid the entry cost start operating only if their ﬁrst productivity shock is greater than
the exit threshold. In our framework, prospective entrants are heterogeneous. Some
obtain a greater signal than others and therefore face better short–term prospects. A
larger fraction of them will indeed start operating. Our modeling assumption introduces
a further selection eﬀect.
The entry threshold q∗ is strictly increasing in the wage rate. Everything else equal,
the higher the wage the higher must be the signal in order to ensure that the expected
value of entering is higher than the cost of entry. This will play an important role in the
analysis of the scenario with aggregate shocks.
3.2 Calibration
Before we plunge into the description of our calibration procedure, it is worth noticing
that there are uncountably many pairs (M,γ) which yield stationary equilibria that diﬀer
only in scale. That is, they only diﬀer in the volume of entrant and operating ﬁrms. All
the statistics of interest for our study will be the same.
To see why this is the case, start from a given equilibrium and consider raising γ. The
original equilibrium wage will elicit a greater supply of labor. Now it is easy to ﬁnd a
new, greater entry volume such that demand for labor in stationary equilibrium will equal
supply at the original wage.
Table 1 lists the values assigned to the parameters. One period is assumed to be one
8year. Consistent with most macroeconomic studies, we assume that R = 1.04, δ = 0.1,
and α = 0.3. We set θ, which governs returns to scale, equal to 0.8. This value is on the
lower end of the range of estimates recovered by Basu and Fernald (1997) using aggregate
data. Using plant–level data, Lee (2005) ﬁnds that returns to scale in manufacturing vary
from 0.828 to 0.91, depending on the estimator.
Description Symbol Value
Capital share α 0.3
Span of control θ 0.8
Depreciation rate δ 0.1
Interest rate R 1.04
Labor supply elasticity γ 5.0
Persist. idiosync. shock ρs 0.55
Variance idiosync. shock σs 0.215
Fixed cost of operation cf 0.00533
Fixed cost of investment c0 0.0002
Variable cost of investment c1 0.036
Pareto exponent ξ 15.0
Entry cost ce 0.0015
Table 1: Parameter Values.
We have no direct information on M, the mass of prospective entrants. Given all other
parameters, a choice of M pins down the equilibrium wage rate w. Since we do not have a
suitable calibration target for it, we decided to set M in such a way that the equilibrium
wage equals 3 and then verify that the results described below are not particular to this
scenario.
As long as we are not interested in the economy’ scale, the choice of the supply
elasticity γ is immaterial. Given what argued above, for any increase in the elasticity of
supply there exists an increase in M that results in an equilibrium that diﬀers from the
initial one only in the scale of the economy. We let γ = 5.0, the value that emerges from
the calibration of the model with aggregate ﬂuctuations. In that scenario, γ is pin down
by the volatility of employment with respect to output. See Section 4.
The remaining parameters were chosen in such a way that a number of statistics com-
puted using a panel of simulated data are close to their empirical counterparts. Since the
model is highly non–linear, it is not possible to match parameters to moments. However,
the mechanics of the model clearly indicates what are the key parameters for each set of
moments.
The parameters of the process driving the idiosyncratic shock, along with those gov-
9erning the adjustment costs, were chosen to match the mean and standard deviation of the
investment rate, the autocorrelation of investment, and the rate of inaction. The targets
of our calibration are the moments computed by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) using a
balanced panel from the LRD from 1972 to 1988.5
Finally, the parameters ξ, ce, and cf were chosen to match the entry rate and the size
of entrants and exiters, relative to survivors. The targets are the statistics obtained by
Lee and Mukoyama (2009) using the LRD. Notice that entry and exit rate must be the
same in stationary equilibrium. Table 2 shows that the model is able to hit all the targets,
with the exception of exiters’ relative size.
Statistic Model Data
Mean investment rate 0.136 0.122
Std. Dev. investment rate 0.306 0.337
Investment autocorrelation 0.062 0.058
Inaction rate 0.085 0.081
Entry rate 0.062 0.062
Entrants’ relative size 0.59 0.60
Exiters’ relative size 0.23 0.49
Table 2: Calibration Targets.
3.3 Firm Dynamics
In this section, we describe the model’s implications for ﬁrm growth and survival, and
compare them with the empirical evidence. Unless otherwise noted, size is proxied by
employment.
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the unconditional relation between exit hazard
rate and age. Consistent with Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) and all other
studies we are aware of, the exit hazard rate decreases with age. This is the case because
on average entrants are less productive than incumbents. As a cohort ages, the survivors’
productivity and value increase, leading to lower exit rates. See the right panel of Figure
2.
A similar mechanism is also at work in Hopenhayn (1992). In his framework, however,
there exists a size threshold such that the exit rate is 100% for smaller ﬁrms and identically
zero for larger ﬁrms. This feature is at odds with the evidence.6 In our model, ﬁrms
5Following Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), we deﬁne as periods of inaction those in which the invest-
ment rate is less than 1%.
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Figure 2: The exit hazard rate
with the same employment will be characterized by diﬀerent combinations of (k,s) and
therefore will have diﬀerent continuation values. Those with relatively low capital and
relatively high productivity will be less likely to exit.
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) also found that in the US manufacturing
sector, establishment growth is unconditionally negatively correlated with both age and
size. This ﬁnding has been conﬁrmed for a variety of sectors and countries.7 Evans (1987)
and Hall (1987) found evidence that ﬁrm growth declines with size even when we condition
on age, and viceversa.
Hopenhayn (1992) is consistent with these facts, with the exception of the conditional
correlation between growth and age. In his model, idiosyncratic productivity is a suﬃ-
cient statistics for ﬁrm size and growth. Conditional on age, smaller ﬁrms grow faster
because the stochastic process is mean–reverting. However, ﬁrms of the same size behave
identically, regardless of their age. The model generates the right unconditional relation
between age and growth, simply because age and size are positively correlated in the
stationary distribution. When controlling for size, age is uncorrelated with growth.
Our version of the model is consistent with all the facts about growth listed above.
Figure 3 illustrates the unconditional correlations. In our setup, the state variables are
productivity and capital. Conditional on age, employment growth declines with size
because larger ﬁrms tend to have higher productivity levels. Given that productivity is
mean–reverting, their growth rates will be lower.
Now consider all the ﬁrms with the same employment. Since adjustment costs prevent
the instantaneous adjustment of capital to the ﬁrst–best size implied by productivity, some
of the ﬁrms will be characterized by a relatively low capital and high shock, and others by
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Figure 3: Unconditional Relationship between Growth, Age, and Size.
a relatively high capital and low shock. The former will grow faster, because investment
and employment are catching up with the optimal size dictated by productivity. The latter
will shrink, as the scale of production is adjusted to the new, lower level of productivity.
This implies a conditional negative association between age and size because, on average,
ﬁrms with relatively high k and low s will be older than ﬁrms with low k and high s.
This feature is driven by relatively young ﬁrms. For those among them which are
shrinking, productivity must have declined. For this to happen, they must have had the
time to grow in the ﬁrst place. On average, they will be older than those that share the
same size, but are growing instead.
The model is consistent with the evidence on ﬁrm growth even when we proxy size with
capital rather than employment. Conditional on age, capital will be negatively correlated
with growth for the same reason as above. It will still be the case that larger ﬁrms will have
higher productivity on average. Another mechanism contributes to generating the right
conditional correlation between growth and size. Because of investment adjustment costs,
same–productivity ﬁrms will have diﬀerent capital stocks. The larger ones are those whose
productivity has been declining, while the smaller ones are those whose productivity has
been increasing. The former are in the process of shrinking, while the latter are growing.
We just argued that ﬁrms with the same capital will have diﬀerent productivity levels.
For given capital, ﬁrms with higher shocks are growing, while ﬁrms with lower shocks
are shrinking. Once again, the negative conditional correlation between growth and age
follows from the observation that, on average, ﬁrms with higher shocks are younger.
It is worth emphasizing that, no matter the deﬁnition of size, the conditional relation
between age and growth is driven by relatively young ﬁrms. Age matters for growth
even when conditioning on size, because it is (conditionally) negatively associated with
12productivity. To our knowledge, only two other papers present models that are consistent
with this fact. The mechanism at work in D’Erasmo (2009) is similar to ours. Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) obtain the result in a version of Hopenhayn (1992)’s model with ﬁnancial
frictions and exogenous exit.8
The left panel of Figure 4 shows the ﬁrm size distribution that obtains in stationary
equilibrium. Noticeably, it displays skewness to the right. The right panel illustrates the
evolution of a cohort size size distribution over time. Skewness declines as the cohort
ages. Both of these features are consistent with the evidence gathered by Cabral and
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Figure 4: Evolution of a Cohort’s Size Distribution
4 Aggregate Fluctuations – Mechanics
We now move to the scenario with aggregate ﬂuctuations. In order to formulate their
choices, ﬁrms need to forecast the wage in the next period. The labor market clearing
condition implies that the equilibrium wage at time t satisﬁes the following restriction:
logwt =
log[(1 − α)θzt]
1 + γ[1 − (1 − α)θ]
+
1 − (1 − α)θ
1 + γ[1 − (1 − α)θ]
Gt, (1)
with Gt = log




. The log–wage is an aﬃne function of the
logarithm of aggregate productivity and of a moment of the distribution.
Unfortunately, the dynamics of Gt depends on the evolution of Γt. It follows that
the vector of state variables λt consists of the distribution Γt and the aggregate shock
8In Cooley and Quadrini (2001), a necessary condition for the result to hold is that young ﬁrms are
relatively more productive. It is not clear whether, allowing for endogenous exit, this would lead to a
counterfactual negative relation between age and exit hazard rates.
13zt. Faced with the formidable task of approximating an inﬁnitely–dimensional object, we
follow Krusell and Smith (1998) and conjecture that Gt+1 is an aﬃne function of Gt and
logzt+1. Then, (1) implies that the equilibrium wage follows the following law of motion:
logwt+1 = β0 + β1 logwt + β2 logzt+1 + β3 logzt + εt+1. (2)
When computing the numerical approximation of the equilibrium allocation, we will
impose that ﬁrms form expectations about the evolution of the wage assuming that (2)
holds true. This means that the aggregate state variables reduce to the pair (wt,zt). The
parameters {β0,β1,β2,β3} will be set equal to the values that maximize the accuracy of
the prediction rule. The deﬁnition of accuracy and its assessment are discussed in Section
4.2. The algorithm is described in detail in Appendix A.
4.1 Calibration
With respect to the stationary case, we need to calibrate three more parameters. These
are ρz and σz, which shape the dynamics of aggregate productivity, and the labor supply
elasticity γ. We set them in order to generate certain values for the standard deviation
and auto–correlation of industry output, as well as the standard deviation of employment
(relative to output).
The targets for the ﬁrst two are standard deviation and autocorrelation of (linearly de–
trended) non–farm private value added from 1947 to 2008, from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The third target is the standard deviation of (linearly de–trended) employment,
also in the non–farm private sector and for the same period, from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
The mass of entrants M is chosen in such a way that the mean unconditional wage is
equal to 3, the value we used in the calibration of the stationary model.
4.2 The Forecasting Rule
The forecasting rule for the equilibrium wage turns out to be
log(wt+1) = 0.32732 + 0.70195log(wt) + 0.31232log(zt+1) − 0.06759log(zt) + εt+1.
The wage is persistent and mean–reverting. A positive aggregate shock increases the
demand for labor from both incumbents and entrants. This is why the coeﬃcient of
log(zt+1) (β2) is estimated to be positive. For the same reason, the coeﬃcient of log(zt)
(β3) is negative. The larger the aggregate shock in the previous period, the smaller is
14Description Symbol Value
Capital share α 0.3
Span of control θ 0.8
Depreciation rate δ 0.1
Interest rate R 1.04
Labor supply elasticity γ 5.0
Persist. idiosync. shock ρs 0.55
Variance idiosync. shock σs 0.215
Persist. aggregate shock ρz 0.65
Variance aggregate shock σz 0.008
Fixed cost of operation cf 0.00533
Fixed cost of investment c0 0.0002
Variable cost of investment c1 0.036
Pareto exponent ξ 15.0
Entry cost ce 0.001
Table 3: Parameter Values.
Statistic Model Data
Std. dev. output 0.040 0.040
Autocorrelation output. investment rate 0.894 0.782
Std. dev. employment (rel. to output) 0.833 0.923
Table 4: Additional Calibration Targets.
going to be the expected increment in aggregate productivity, and therefore the lower the
wage increase.
In the literature with heterogeneous agents and aggregate risk it has become standard
to evaluate the accuracy of the forecasting rule by assessing the R2 of the regression,
which in our case is 0.9991. However, as pointed out by Den Haan (2010), this choice
is questionable on at least three grounds. To start with, the R2 considers predictions
made conditional on wages generated by the true law of motion. In this sense, it only
assesses the accuracy of one–period ahead forecasts. Second, the R2 is an average. In the
numerical literature, it is standard to report maximum errors instead. Last, but not least,
the R2 scales the error term by the variance of the dependent variable. The problem here
is that it is often not clear what the appropriate scaling is. The root mean squared error
(0.00021 in our case) does not suﬀer from the latter shortcoming, but is aﬀected by the
ﬁrst two.
Here we follow Den Haan (2010)’ suggestion to assess the accuracy of our forecasting
rule by calculating the maximum discrepancy (in absolute value) between the actual
15wage and the wage generated by the rule without updating. That is, we compute the
maximum pointwise diﬀerence between the sequence of actual market–clearing wages and
that generated by our rule, when next period’s predicted wage is conditional on last
period’s prediction for the current wage rather than the market clearing wage. The value
of that statistics over 24,500 simulations is 0.296%.
The frequency distribution of percentage forecasting errors is illustrated in the left
panel in Figure 5. The right panel is a scatter plot of equilibrium wages and their respective
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Figure 5: Accuracy of the Forecasting Rule.
4.3 Entry and Exit
The value of an incumbent is strictly increasing in aggregate productivity and strictly
decreasing in the wage. Given that the cost of entry is constant, the entry threshold will
be greater the lower is aggregate productivity and the greater is the equilibrium wage.
See the left panel in Figure 6 for an illustration.
Everything equal, a rise in productivity will lead to an increase in the number of en-
trants. Given that the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is stochastically increasing in
the value of the signal, such a rise will also lead to a decline in entrants’ average idiosyn-
cratic eﬃciency. However, wether periods of high aggregate TFP will be characterized by
high entry volumes and low entrants’ average productivity will depend on the dynamics
of the wage.
The right panel of Figure 6 illustrates the eﬀect of changes in aggregate productivity
on the optimal exit decision. The two lines represent the loci in the (k,s) space that make






































Figure 6: Left: Entry Threshold on the Signal Space. Right: Exit Threshold.
aggregate productivity.
Since the outside value is invariant at zero, everything else equal a greater aggregate
productivity will lead to a lower productivity of the marginal exiter, for all levels of the
capital stock. In other words, the average idiosyncratic productivity of non-exiting ﬁrms
will be lower. Since variations in the wage rate have the opposite eﬀects on the exit locus
and higher productivity episodes will be characterized by high wages, a priori it cannot
be established whether this will also be a feature of equilibrium dynamics.
5 Aggregate Fluctuations – Results
5.1 Cyclical Behavior of Entry and Exit
Table 5 reports the raw correlations of entry rate, exit rate, and the size of entrants
and exiters (relative to incumbents) with industry output. Consistent with the evidence
presented by Campbell (1998), the entry rate is pro–cyclical and the exit rate is counter–
cyclical.
Entry Rate Exit Rate Entrants’ Size Exiters’ Size
0.222 -0.351 -0.150 -0.478
Table 5: Correlations with industry output.
Interestingly, Campbell (1998) also provides evidence on the correlations between entry
rate, exit rate, and future and lagged output growth. He ﬁnds that the correlation of entry
with lagged output growth is greater than the contemporaneous correlation and that the
exit rate is positively correlated with future output growth.
17Our model is consistent with both features. While the correlation of entry rate with
contemporaneous output growth is 0.1124, that with one–period lagged output growth
is 0.899. The reason is that the entry decision is taken contingent on the information
available one period before the start of operations. The correlation between exit rate and
one–period ahead output growth is 0.12. The correlation with two–period ahead output
growth is 0.09. The reason is that periods of low exit tend to be periods of high output.
Given the mean–reverting nature of the process, on average such periods will be followed
by times of low output growth.
Analyzing data from the LRD, Lee and Mukoyama (2009) ﬁnd that selection at entry
is quantitatively very important. Entering plants tend to be more productive when the
industry is in recession than when it is in expansion. Our model shares this feature of the
data, as the correlation between the average size of entering ﬁrms and output is negative.
This result obtains because when the common productivity component is low, only ﬁrms
with a relatively high level of idiosyncratic productivity ﬁnd it worthwhile to enter.
The banking literature also found evidence in support of the claim that aggregate
conditions have an impact on selection at entry. A number of papers, among which
Cetorelli (2009), ﬁnd that when credit market conditions are relatively favorable, entering
ﬁrms are less productive on average.
The relative size of exiters is also higher during recession. A drop in the common
productivity component leads to a lower value of all incumbents. It follows that the
marginal exiter will have a higher value of the idiosyncratic productivity component.
5.2 Impulse Responses
The objective of this section is to describe the impulse response functions in order to gain
some more intuition about the model’s dynamics. We initialized the system by assuming
that the distribution of ﬁrms is equal to the point–wise mean on the ergodic set. The
common productivity component is set at its mean value. At time t = 1, we impose that
the exogenous aggregate productivity component rises by about 3% and we compute the
evolution of the size distribution over the next 20 periods. We repeated this experiment
for 3,000 times and depicted the averages of selected variables in Figures 7 and 8.
The left–most panel on the top of Figure 7 simply reports the deviation of the common
productivity component from its unconditional mean. Not surprisingly, output, the wage
rate and employment display similar dynamics. The contemporaneous response to the
shock is almost entirely due to the expansion in hiring by incumbents.
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Figure 7: Response to a positive productivity shock.
Exit also reacts with delay, because it is optimal for entrepreneurs to disinvest before
closing down shop. In period 2, exit drops dramatically, while entry rises. This is why
output and employment peak.
The number of operating ﬁrms peak in period 3. In the following periods, the exit
volume is greater than entry. Therefore, the number of operating ﬁrms declines.
The two right–most panels show that the convergence of both exit and entry rates to
their unconditional means is not monotone. The exit rate overshoots its long–run value.
The entry rate undershoots. These features stem from the fact that the wage decays at a
lower pace than aggregate productivity.
A few periods after the positive shock hits, the aggregate component of productivity
is back close to its unconditional mean. However, the wage is still relatively high. The
reason is that the volume of entry is ﬁnite and ﬁrms are born relatively small. As the
survivors become more eﬃcient, their labor demand increases, keeping the wage from
falling faster. With a relatively high wage and relatively low aggregate productivity, the
selection eﬀect changes sign. Entry falls below its long–run value, while exit is higher
than that.
Figure 8 shows that, following the hike in the aggregate component, the average id-
iosyncratic productivity of both entrants and exiters declines. In turn, this leads to a
fall in the industry’s average idiosyncratic eﬃciency. The relative size of entrants and
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Figure 8: Response to a positive productivity shock.
and the incumbents’ idiosyncratic productivity. Consistent with the above discussion, the
convergence of average idiosyncratic productivity levels to their unconditional means is
not monotone.
6 The importance of entry and exit
In this section we show that allowing for entry and exit enhances the model’s internal
propagation mechanism. A corollary of this result is that measuring the aggregate Solow
residual as it is customary done in macroeconomics results in an upward bias in its per-
sistence’s estimate.
This is the outcome of two forces. One is the pro–cyclicality of the entry rate. The
other is the fact that ﬁrms start out relatively unproductive, but quickly grow in size
and eﬃciency. This dynamics is reﬂected in the contribution of net entry to aggregate
productivity growth. As it is the case in the data, the contribution of new entrants is
small in their ﬁrst year, but then grows disproportionably faster than their number.
Finally, we describe our model’s implications for the cyclicality of the cross–sectional
standard deviation of productivity growth.
206.1 Propagation
Think of the economy considered in Section 5, but abstract from entry and exit. At
every point in time, there is a mass of ﬁrms whose technology is exactly as speciﬁed
above. However, ﬁrms never exit. As our purpose is to compare such economy with our
benchmark, let’s assume that the number of operating ﬁrms is equal to unconditional
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Figure 9: Accuracy of the Forecasting Rule.
In the right panel of ﬁgure 9 we plotted the impulse response of industry output to a
positive aggregate shocks. For comparison, the left panel reports the impulse response in
the benchmark scenario.
Since entry and exit are essentially determined one period ahead, it is not surprising
that the contemporaneous response of the two economies is about the same. In either
case, the increase in output is due the rise in hiring by incumbents. In period 2, output
increases in the benchmark economy, while it decreases in the scenario without entry or
exit. This is expected, as entry increases.
What is perhaps less expected is that the process of output mean–reversion is slower
when we allow for entry and exit. In other words, aggregate output is more persistent.
The diﬀerence is driven by the dynamics of ﬁrms born during the expansion. Firms that
entered in the wake of positive shocks are initially very small and therefore account for a
rather small fraction of total output. Over time, however, they grow in eﬃciency and size.
This process takes place at the same time in which the aggregate productivity component
regresses towards its unconditional mean. As a result, aggregate output and eﬃciency fall
at a slower pace.
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Figure 10: Accuracy of the Forecasting Rule.
Figure 10. The solid lines depict the impulse responses of the aggregate productivity
component zt. They are identical by construction. The dashed lines depict the Solow
residuals in the two economies, computed by assuming an aggregate production function
of the Cobb–Douglas form with capital share equal to 0.3. That is, we plotted log(Yt) −
αlog(Kt)−(1−α)log(Lt). The evolution of the residual depends on the dynamics of both
zt and the distribution of the idiosyncratic component st. In the benchmark economy, the
latter improves over time. In the case without entry and exit, it is time–invariant.
The simple exercise just conducted hints that trying to infer information about the
process of aggregate productivity using a model without entry or exit will inevitably give
the wrong answer. Such model will interpret changes in aggregate eﬃciency that results
from the reallocation of output shares towards more eﬃcient ﬁrms as changes in the
exogenous aggregate component.
We also conducted the alternative experiment of setting the parameters in the economy
without entry and exit in such a way that it generates the same values of the target
moments as the benchmark economy. To generate an autocorrelation of output equal to
0.89, we had to set ρz = 0.775, much higher than the value of 0.65 assumed in Section 4.
6.2 Productivity Decomposition
Necessary conditions for the increase in propagation that we have just described are that
entry is pro–cyclical and that entrants’ productivity grows faster than the incumbents’.
Is there any evidence that the latter claim holds true in the data?
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) conducted a thorough and comprehensive re-
view of the literature that exploits longitudinal establishment data in order to understand
the determinants of aggregate productivity growth. One of their ﬁndings is that the con-
22tribution of net entry to productivity growth tends to be small in high–frequency studies,
while it is much larger in lower–frequency analyses. To a large extent, this is due to the
fact that because of selection and/or learning, the productivity gap between entrants and
exiters is greater, the longer the time between observations.
Conducting a standard productivity decomposition on simulated data generated by our
model leads to the same conclusion. In our case, selection and mean-reverting productivity
are the assumptions that are responsible for the result.
Deﬁne total factor productivity as the weighted sum of ﬁrm–level Solow residuals,
where the weights are the output shares. Let Ct denote the collection of plants active in
both periods t − k and t. The set Et includes the plants that entered between the two
dates and are still active at time t. In Xt−k are the ﬁrms that were active at time t − k,
but exited before time t.
Following Haltiwanger (1997), the growth in TFP can be decomposed into ﬁve com-
ponents, corresponding to the addenda in equation (3). They are known as (i) the within
component, which measures the changes in productivity for continuing plants, (ii) the
between–plant portion, which reﬂects the change in output shares across continuing plants,
















[log(TFPi,t−k) − log(TFPt−k)]φi,t−k (3)
Table 6 reports the results that obtain when we set k equal to 1 and 5, respectively.
In the last column, labeled Net Entry, we report the diﬀerence between the entry and exit
components. Recall that in our model the unconditional mean of aggregate productivity
growth is identically zero.
k Within Between Covariance Entry Exit Net Entry
1 -8.8477 -3.3663 11.9392 -0.5584 -0.8337 0.2753
5 -15.0994 -10.6881 24.4110 -0.9062 -2.2832 1.3770
Table 6: Productivity Decomposition (percentages).
The between and within components are necessarily negative, because of mean rever-
9With φit and TFPit we denote ﬁrm i’s output share and measured total factor productivity at time
t, respectively. TFPt is the weighted average total factor productivity across all ﬁrms active at time t.
23sion in the process driving idiosyncratic productivity. Larger ﬁrms, which tend to be more
productive, shrink on average. Smaller ﬁrms, on the contrary, tend to grow. The covari-
ance component is positive, because ﬁrms that become more productive also increase in
size.
On average, both the entry and exit contributions are negative. This reﬂects the fact
that both entrants and exiters are less productive than average. However, entrants tend
to be more productive than exiters. The contribution of net entry to productivity growth
is positive regardless of the horizon.
What’s most relevant for our analysis is that for k = 5 the contribution of net entry
is one order of magnitude larger than for k = 1. In part, this is due to the fact that
the share of output produced by entrants increases with k. However, this cannot be the
whole story. The contribution of entry is roughly −0.56% for k = 1 and goes to −0.9%
for k = 5. If entrants’ productivity did not grow faster than average, the contribution of
entry for the k = 5 horizon would be much smaller.
6.3 Cyclical Variation of Cross–sectional Moments
A recent literature has documented that idiosyncratic risk faced by economic agents is
strongly counter–cyclical. For example, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) ﬁnd that
individual labor income is riskier during recessions.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) and Bachman and Bayer (2009b) argue that ﬁrm–level
uncertainty is also counter–cyclical. Their conclusion is based on the ﬁnding that the
cross–sectional standard deviation of ﬁrm–level TFP growth in an unbalanced panel is
negatively correlated with detrended GDP. Recognizing the possibility that systematic
cyclical variation in entry and exit selection may bias their results, Bachman and Bayer
(2009b) estimate a selection model, where lagged Solow residuals determine selection.
Our theory suggests that the concern of Bachman and Bayer (2009b) is justiﬁed.
Time–varying selection in entry and exit does generate systematic compositional changes
in the cross–sectional distribution of idiosyncratic productivity, suggesting that particular
care should be placed in inferring the properties of the process of ﬁrm–level productivity
from information on cross–sectional moments. If the process responsible for generating
their data was consistent with our theory, there would be systematic cyclical sample
selection.
The good news is that the selection bias reinforces their results. With an homoscedastic
process for idiosyncratic productivity, the cross–sectional standard deviation of ﬁrm–level
TFP growth is larger during expansions than during recessions. This rules out the possi-
24bility that, in spite of ﬁnding a counter–cyclical variation in the cross–sectional standard
deviation of ﬁrm–level TFP growth, idiosyncratic uncertainty faced my ﬁrms is indeed
acyclical.
In our framework, expansions are times in which the number of entrants is relatively
high and their average productivity is relatively low. As a result, the distribution of ﬁrms
over idiosyncratic productivity is more skewed to the right, i.e. it has relatively more
mass on low values of the shock.
This is illustrated in Figure 11. For each level of idiosyncratic shock, it plots the
diﬀerence between the (average) fraction of ﬁrms associated with it in expansion and in
recession, respectively. In expansions we record a larger fraction of ﬁrms with less than
average idiosyncratic productivity.













Figure 11: Change in the Cross-Sectional Distribution.
This immediately implies that the mean idiosyncratic productivity is counter–cyclical.
As it turns out, the standard deviation is also counter–cyclical. Given that the expected
growth of productivity is monotonically decreasing in its level, both the cross–sectional
mean and standard deviation of productivity growth are pro–cyclical.
Since the conditional survival rate is higher during expansions, there will be ﬁrms that,
following a drop in idiosyncratic productivity, will exit in a recession (when aggregate TFP
is low) but will keep operating in an expansion. For such ﬁrms, recorded productivity
growth will be higher during a recession. In our simulations this eﬀect is dominated by
the one described above.
257 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework for the study of the dynamics of the cross–section of
ﬁrms and its implications for aggregate dynamics. When calibrated to match a set of
moments of the investment process, our model delivers implications for ﬁrm dynamics
and for the cyclicality of entry and exit that are consistent with the evidence.
The survival rate increases with size. The growth rate of employment is decreasing
with size and age, both unconditionally and conditionally. The size distribution of ﬁrms
is skewed to the right. When tracking the size distribution over the life a cohort, the
skewness declines with age.
The entry rate is positively correlated with current and lagged output growth. The
exit rate is negatively correlated with output growth and positively associated with future
growth.
We show that allowing for entry and exit enhances the internal propagation mechanism
of the model. This obtains because of four features of the equilibrium allocation: (i) entry
is pro–cyclical, (ii) entrants are smaller than the average incumbent, and (iii) particularly
so during expansions. Finally, (iv) idiosyncratic productivity is mean reverting.
A positive shock to aggregate productivity leads to an in increase in entry. Con-
sistent with the empirical evidence, the new entrants are smaller and less eﬃcient than
incumbents. The skewness of the distribution of ﬁrms over the idiosyncratic productivity
component increases. As the exogenous component of aggregate productivity declines
towards its unconditional mean, the new entrants that survive grow in productivity and
size. That is, the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity improves.
For a version of our model without entry or exit to generate a data–conforming per-
sistence of output, the ﬁrst–order autocorrelation of aggregate productivity shocks must
be 0.775. In the benchmark scenario with entry and exit, it needs only be 0.65.
Even though idiosyncratic productivity is homoscedastic by assumption, systematic
time–varying selection in entry implies that both mean and standard deviation of the
cross–sectional distribution of ﬁrm–level Solow residual are counter–cyclical. Since id-
iosyncratic productivity is also mean–reverting, the cross–sectional mean and standard
deviation of productivity growth are pro–cyclical. This is important, because it identiﬁes
the sign of the bias that is implicit in the estimates of these cross–sectional moments in
unbalanced panels.
26A Numerical Approximation
Our algorithm consists of the following steps.
1. Guess values for the parameters of the wage forecasting rule ˆ β =
 
ˆ β0, ˆ β1, ˆ β2, ˆ β3
 
;
2. Approximate the value function of the incumbent ﬁrm;
3. Simulate the economy for T periods, starting from an arbitrary initial condition
(z0,Γ0);
4. Obtain a new guess for ˆ β by running regression (2) over the time–series {wt,zt}
T
t=S+1,
where S is the number of observation to be scrapped because the dynamical system
has not reached its ergodic set yet;
5. If the new guess for ˆ β is close to the previous one, stop. If not, go back to step 2.
A.1 Approximation of the value function
The incumbent’s value function is approximated by value function iteration.
1. Start by deﬁning grids for the state variables w,z,k,s. Denote them as Ψw, Ψz,
Ψk, and Ψs, respectively. The wage grid is equally spaced and centered around
the equilibrium wage of the stationary economy. The capital grid is constructed
following the method suggested by McGrattan (1999). The grids and transition
matrices for the two shocks are constructed following Tauchen (1986). For all pairs
(s,s′) such that s,s′ ∈ Ψs, let H(s′|s) denote the probability that next period’s
idiosyncratic shock equals s′, conditional on today’s being s. For all (z,z′) such
that z,z′ ∈ Ψz, let also G(z′|z) denote the probability that next period’s aggregate
shock equals z′, conditional on today’s being z.
2. For all triplets (w,z,z′) on the grid, the forecasting rule yields a wage forecast for
the next period (tildes denote elements not on the grid):
log( ˜ w′) = ˆ β0 + ˆ β1 log(w) + ˆ β2 log(z′) + ˆ β3 log(z).
In general, ˜ w′ will not belong to the grid of wages. There will be contiguous grid
points (wi,wi+1) such that wi ≤ ˜ w′ ≤ wi+1. Now let J(wi|w,z,z′) = 1 − ˜ w′−wi
wi+1−wi,
J(wi+1|w,z,z′) = ˜ w′−wi
wi+1−wi, and J(wj|w,z,z′) = 0 for all j such that j  = i and
j  = i + 1. This will allow us to evaluate the value function for values of the wage
which are oﬀ the grid, by linear interpolation;
273. For all grid elements (w,z,k,s), guess values for the value function V0(w,z,k,s);





















s.t. x = k′ − k(1 − δ),
π(w,z,k,s) =








χ = 1 if k′  = k and χ = 0 otherwise .
5. Keep on iterating until sup
 




    < 10.0−6. Denote the latest value
function as V∞(w,z,k,s).
A.2 Entry
1. Deﬁne a grid for the signal. Denote it as Ψq. Let also W(sn|q) indicate the proba-
bility that the ﬁrst draw of the idiosyncratic shock is sn, conditional on the signal
being q.













3. For all grid points z, construct a bi-dimensional cubic spline interpolation of Ve(w,z,q)
over the dimensions (w,q). For all pairs ˜ w, ˜ q, denote the value of entering as
˜ Ve( ˜ w,z, ˜ q).
4. Deﬁne ˜ qe( ˜ w,z) as the value of the signal which makes prospective entrants indiﬀerent
between entering and not. That is, ˜ Ve( ˜ w,z, ˜ qe( ˜ w,z)) = ce.
A.3 Simulation
1. Given the current ﬁrm distribution Γt and aggregate shock zt, compute the equi-
















282. For all z′ ∈ Ψz, compute the conditional wage forecast ˜ wt+1(z′) as follows:
log[ ˜ wt+1(z′)] = ˆ β0 + ˆ β1 log( ˜ wt) + ˆ β2 log(z′) + ˆ β3 log(zt).
For every z′, there will be contiguous grid points (wi,wi+1) such that wi ≤ ˜ wt+1(z′) ≤
wi+1. Now let Jt+1(wi|z′) = 1−
˜ wt+1(z′)−wi
wi+1−wi , Jt+1(wi|z′) =
˜ wt+1(z′)−wi
wi+1−wi , and Jt+1(wj|z′) =
0 for all j such that j  = i and j  = i + 1;
3. For all pairs (k,s) on the grid such that Γt(k,s) > 0, the optimal choice of capital
k′(˜ wt,zt,k,s) is the solution to the following problem:
max
k′∈Ψk















s.t. x = k′ − k(1 − δ),
π( ˜ wt,zt,k,s) =






t [(1 − α)θsztkαθ]
1
1−θ(1−α),
χ = 1 if k′  = k and χ = 0 otherwise .
4. There will be contiguous elements of the signal grid (q∗,q∗∗) such that q∗ ≤ ˜ qe( ˜ wt,zt) ≤
q∗∗.
• For all q ≥ q∗∗, the initial capital of entrants k′
















• We can easily compute the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock conditional
on ˜ qe ≡ ˜ qe( ˜ wt,zt), denoted as ˜ W(sn|˜ qe) and then compute the optimal capital
k′














e,sn) ˜ W(sn|˜ qe)Jt(wi|zj)G(zj|zt)
5. Draw the aggregate productivity shock zt+1;
6. Determine the distribution at time t+1. For all (k,s) such that V∞( ˜ wt+1(zt+1),zt+1,k,s) =










1 if k′(wt,zt,km,sn) = k
0 otherwise.
and Et+1(k,s) = M
 




1 if k′(wt,zt,qi) = k
0 otherwise.
A.4 More Accuracy Tests of the Forecasting Rule
Forecasting errors are essentially unbiased – the mean error is -0.00017% of the forecasting
price – and uncorrelated with the price (the correlation coeﬃcient between the two series
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Figure 12: Accuracy of the Forecasting Rule.
In the left panel of Figure 12 is the scatter plot of the forecasting errors against the
market clearing price. In the right panel is the time series of the forecasting error. The
good news is that errors do not cumulate.
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